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Unfolding the Social: Quasi-actants, Virtual Theory, and the New 
Empiricism of Bruno Latour 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An important philosopher and anthropologist of science, Bruno Latour has recently 
outlined an ambitious programme for a new sociological empiricism, in continuation of 
his actor-network-theory (ANT). Interrogating issues of description, explanation and 
theoretical interpretation in this ‘sociology of associations’, we argue that certain 
internal tensions are manifest. While Latour’s philosophy of social science demands an 
absolute abandonment of theory in all its forms, proposing instead to simply ‘go on 
describing’, he is in practice employing versions of common sense explanation and 
pragmatic-constructivist theory to make ends meet. The core of this tension, we claim, 
can be located in Latour’s meta-theoretical commitments, in effect obscuring important 
ways in which human subjects employ things, effects and symbols beyond their simple, 
‘empirical’ existence. To illustrate these claims, we deploy the example of how morality 
works in social life, and coin the term quasi-actant, in allusion to the Latourian actant, 
to better understand such processes. Our overall criticism of ANT is immanent, aiming 
at the re-introduction of what we dub ‘virtual theory’ into Latourian empiricism, thus 
further strengthening what remains one of the most promising contemporary attempts to 
reinvigorate the sociological enterprise.  
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1. Introduction: Latour between radical descriptivism and empirical obscurity 
 
In his recent book-length introduction to Actor-Network Theory (ANT) – Reassembling 
the Social (2005) – French philosopher and anthropologist of science, Bruno Latour, has 
given his thinking a distinctly sociological bend. He now aligns his well-known 
analyses of sciences and technologies (e.g. Latour 1988a; 1996a) with a general 
sociological programme, dubbed the ‘sociology of associations’, to distinguish it from 
the tradition of the ‘sociology of the social’ running from Durkheim through to 
Giddens, Habermas, and Bourdieu. Sociologists of the social, Latour want us to realize, 
mistakenly sought to explain the social by society: some social stuff (power, capital, 
norms) explains other social stuff (behaviours, practices, institutions). According to 
Latour, this is all wrong: society explains nothing but must itself be explained. Or 
rather, employing case studies and narratives of particular events, social life must be 
carefully described in its concrete details (Latour 2000). Latour, we note, is at the 
forefront of a new descriptive turn in sociology, raising fundamental challenges to the 
methods, theories, and public authority of the discipline (see Savage 2009).  
Revisiting the social with Latour leads to a complete redirection of sociology. 
All the well-known structures of society are suddenly no-where to be found; instead, we 
now find concrete relations of humans and non-humans acting together. Over here is the 
man-computer-spreadsheet-office hybrid that we used to call ‘bureaucratic rationalism’; 
over there is the vibrating man-virus-laboratory relation that we used to call ‘scientific 
fact’, and so on. Sociology of associations entails a change of focus from ‘society’ (of 
humans) to ‘collectives’ (of humans and non-humans). And, symmetrically, its method 
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changes as well: from theoretically interpreting human actions to obstinately ‘following 
the actor’ by tracking and mapping it’s multiple associations. Explanations, Latour 
stresses, are only for lazy sociologists, who want to jump straight to the ‘big picture’ 
without paying the price. This is why Latour is dead serious when he states (2005:146) 
that ‘the name of the game is to get back to empiricism’. While distinguishing his 
second empiricism of shape-shifting techno-scientific objects from the first empiricism 
of Locke and onwards, this only makes the task of description more laborious than 
anticipated. Latour’s ideal remains one of descriptivist empiricism, indeed of a self-
confessedly radical type: ‘just go on describing’ seems to be his new master-rule of 
sociological method (see Latour 2005:110ff).  
In this article, we want to engage in a critical, but fundamentally sympathetic, 
dialogue on Bruno Latour’s empiricist take on sociological method, looking in 
particular at his version of the description-explanation-interpretation triad. Our 
engagement takes the new, hybrid relations between subjects and objects as its starting 
point. Put briefly, we fully agree to Latour’s reworking of the (former) object-pole: if 
anything, Latour should be credited with turning objects as ‘matters-of-fact’ into 
uncertain and disputed ‘matters-of-concern’ (Latour 1996a; 2000; 2002). Instead, our 
basic issue with Latour’s sociological empiricism has to do with the (former) subject-
pole: is the new quasi-subject really so constituted, we want to ask, as to lend itself to 
full description? Will not something crucial be lost in our view of inter-subjective social 
life if we just ‘go on describing’? As we aim to show, raising these classic-sounding 
questions in relation to Latour will allow us to explore some less-frequently travelled 
paths for a more general renewal of sociological methodology.   
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To be specific, we are not seeking here to defend some version of the 
sociology of the social, nor some version of ‘social constructivism’, both consistently 
and convincingly criticised by Latour (e.g. 2000; 2005). Instead, we are engaging in 
immanent critique. In other words, while the stance we develop opens up a space for 
more theoretical interpretation than allowed for by ANT descriptivism, it is still, we 
believe, in full accordance with Latourian principles, which it complements and 
strengthens. In this sense, we think of ourselves as reconstructing, not deconstructing, 
ANT. Needless to say, raising questions of descriptivism and inter-subjectivity in 
relation to Bruno Latour is difficult, since part of his metaphysical programme consists 
exactly in denying the independence of what-was-formerly-known-as ‘the subjective’ 
and ‘the social’. Latour’s is really a theory of ‘inter-objectivity’, not of inter-subjectivity 
(see Latour 1996b). Unsurprisingly, this has given rise to criticisms: humanists (and 
Marxists) worry about the ‘generalized symmetry’ of humans and non-humans (e.g. 
Vandenberghe 2002), while critical realists worry about the consequent collapse of the 
‘stratified ontology’ separating the level of actors and the level of structures (e.g. Elder-
Vass 2008). These criticisms of ANT are expectable, but they bear little resemblance to 
the methodological commitments we champion in this article.  
Rather, our concerns start from the suspicion that Latour may not be 
symmetrical enough in his dealings with (quasi-) objects and subjects, paying much 
more attention to the former than the latter. Partly, this flaw can be traced 
genealogically in ANT: this theory has always been more concerned with redistributing 
our notions of objectivity, particularly in the techno-scientific realm, than with re-
assembling subjectivity (e.g. Latour 1987). What concerns us, then, is whether such 
‘bias’ is acceptable, given the extension of ANT into a general sociology of 
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associations? And if not, how methodological reconstruction can be achieved, while 
staying true to the basic framework of Latour’s social ontology? To frame this 
discussion, Latour’s concepts of folding and working will constitute our point of 
departure, allowing us to get to the crux of what is problematic in his radical 
descriptivism. Hidden in these concepts, we want to argue, is a certain meta-
methodological problem, having to do with the ways in which Latour seems to be 
‘heterogenizing’ human actants in lieu of stabilizing non-humans.  
Our own suggestions can be seen as part of a larger ‘metaphysics of the 
social’, which stresses the crucial issue of empirical obscurity, as opposed to the 
difficulties which Latour already acknowledges. Empirical obscurity, we will argue, 
constitutes the basis on which certain forms of theory – which we end up calling ‘virtual 
theory’ – are much more essential to the practice of sociological inquiry than Latour 
seems to explicitly acknowledge. In this attempt to sharpen ANT methodology, without 
relapsing into sociology of the social, we will introduce the concept of quasi-actants, 
developed as an alternative (or a supplement) to Latour’s notion of black-boxes. This 
distinction is symmetrical to that of empirical obscurity and difficulty: Latour’s black-
boxes constitute tightly packed piles of relations (e.g. IBM as a black-box of actant-
networks), which can nonetheless potentially be ‘(re-)opened’ for full description. 
Quasi-actants, on the contrary, ‘erase their traces’ as they work on the social, making 
full description impossible due to empirical obscurity.  
Throughout the article, issues of morality (broadly understood) will function 
as our main ‘empirical’ reference point, anchoring the methodological reflections. In 
this respect, we do not wish to enter into specifically moral theorizing, various 
philosophical approaches to morality, an exploration of the normative aspects of ANT, 
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or anything of the like. We simply cling on to moral convictions as an important 
embodiment of something traditionally understood to involve human subjectivity, inter-
subjective understandings, and so on. Moral convictions, we might argue, constitute a 
‘hard case’ for Latour’s sociology of associations, since his radical descriptivism will 
have to engage some rather ephemeral and intangible phenomena. Further, focusing on 
morality allows us to ‘follow Latour himself’, in that he has explicitly reflected on this 
topic in relation to his philosophy of technology on several occasions (1992; 1999; 
2002). Following this path will allow us to position quasi-actants and virtual theory as 
important ingredients of a reconstructed ANT landscape – a landscape which, once 
reassembled, will provide fertile ground for the future invigoration of sociology1.  
 
 
2. Fold, work, and description in Latour’s social metaphysics 
 
Taking the article on Morality and Technology: The End of the Means (2002) as a point 
of departure, we encounter one of the more consistent expositions of the concept of the 
fold in Latour’s work2. Folding, in Latour’s usage, denotes a type of acting that 
produces socio-technical relations, through the connecting (in a network-relational 
sense) of one place and time with another that it would otherwise not have been 
connected to (Latour 2002:251; see also Latour 1996b:239). As such, any technology, 
or socio-technical hybrid, can be seen as accumulations of folds, of layers and 
compilations, of detours and re-orderings. Latour gives the straightforward example of a 
hammer, which folds into it a number of different temporalities: ore from the birth of 
the universe, wood that goes back a hundred years or so, and the factory producing the 
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hammer ten years ago. The same goes for places as well: the hammer connects such 
spatially distant places as South-American forests, German mines, the tools department 
of the store etc., locations that would never have been connected outside of this 
particular technology (Latour 2002). 
 According to Latour, this is exactly the characteristic of technology: it reworks, 
or folds, differences in space, time, and agency in new ways, creating new associations, 
and hence new patterns of social relations. This is what, in Reassembling the Social 
(Latour 2005), is called ‘work of mediation’, that is, the work of crafting new actants, 
new hybrids, and new events. A mediator, in Latour’s parlance, is the opposite of an 
‘intermediary’, something which simply transports the action of other entities, as 
implied for instance by notions of a hammer as a ‘mere tool’. Nothing, in Latour’s 
social ontology, is ever a ‘mere tool’: the hammer always modifies the intentions and 
goals of its human co-actant. Action, in short, is ‘not a property of humans but of an 
association of actants’ (Latour 1999:182; emphasis in original). Implicit in this is 
Latour’s version of anti-reductionism, which replaces the idea of causal reduction with 
what (using a Foucauldian expression) could be called ‘causal multiplication’ (see 
Olssen 2008). In methodological ANT terms, causal multiplication is achieved by 
following, and hence unravelling, all the connections folded into an object – that is, by 
unfolding it. If we think of the hammer (or any other technology) as a black-box, 
folding is equivalent to the work of black-boxing (see Latour 1999:183f); while 
unfolding corresponds to the well-known ANT slogan of ‘opening the black-box’, that 
is, re-describing it in detail. The crucial point is that, to Latour, while this re-description 
may be difficult, it should be possible in principle. 
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Now, having established some conceptual premises, we get to a crucial point 
of Latour’s work on morality and technology: his language of hybrids does not only 
concern acts traditionally viewed as ‘object-centred’, such as hammering in a nail, but is 
to be applied equally for acts traditionally viewed as moral or social. To use one of 
Latour’s own famous examples, in the US context of conspicuous rates of hand weapon 
killings, it is neither ‘guns’ nor ‘people’ that ‘kill people’, but rather the hybrid ‘citizen-
gun’ (see Latour 1999:176ff). Many sociologists, no doubt, would start searching for 
‘cultural’ explanations here, thus missing the obvious role played by the availability of 
guns and their person-transforming capabilities. When, in Reassembling the Social 
(2005:205ff), Latour talks of the ‘circulation of subjectifiers’, it is precisely this effect 
of (what used to be called) objects on (what used to be called) subjects he is aiming at. 
For this reason, morality is not something that can be reserved for human ends alone – 
indeed, no fundamental subject-object divide can be maintained (see, e.g., Latour 1999). 
Instead, Latour pushes a strong ‘non-humanism’ by arguing that ‘without technological 
detour, the properly human cannot exist’ (2002:252). In this, rather than reducing 
subjects to the being of objects, Latour seems to be granting objects the becoming of 
subjects: the constant process of entering into new associations3.  
However, this is exactly where our suspicion of asymmetry in Latour’s 
methodology kicks in because, although he attempts to dissolve the subject-object 
divide into generalized symmetry, and although he hybridizes morality and technology, 
he seems one-sidedly interested in the object folds and foldings of society. In other 
words, he seems to have curiously little to say on how human moral convictions fold 
(quasi)-objects, that is, on subject folds and foldings (of itself, of other subjects, and of 
quasi-objects). Indeed, Latour defines human sociality in general by its ability to fold, 
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or hybridize, itself into things, claiming that ‘any time an interaction has temporal and 
spatial extension [i.e. is folded], it is because one has shared it with non-humans’ 
(Latour 1996b:239; also Strum & Latour 1987). Furthermore, as mentioned, Latour 
entertains the notion of dissolving the subject into circulations of subjectifiers; that is, of 
dissolving subjectivity into (quasi)-objectivity, not the inverse way around (Latour 
2005). What was supposed to be an object-subject-hybrid thus tends toward a different 
line of reasoning: the subject as object-object-hybrids. This is a tricky point, because in 
one sense Latour is right: also things contain morality, because human and non-human 
actants are inextricably bound up together. Consequently, our argument with Latour can 
be put non-aggressively, by simply noting that compared to the folding of non-humans, 
Latour has little to say on human folds, including what consequences such foldings have 
for sociological methodology4. In a nutshell, while on the one hand dissolving the 
subject-object divide into hybrids, Latour seems on the other to be heterogenizing the 
(former) subject on behalf of the (former) object (see also Law 2002). Or, put 
differently: to ground human folds in the folding of things. 
On this point, we find it difficult to follow Latour. Moral convictions can 
hardly be described as mediated (in the Latourian sense) by technological things alone. 
To be fair, Latour does seem to acknowledge this point, stating that ‘obviously, a person 
is not constituted solely in the act of grasping a tool’ (2002:253). Further, as if stating 
what is only common sense5, he goes on to say that ‘of course, the moral law is in our 
hearts, but it is also in our apparatuses’ (ibid.:253). The problem is that Latour says very 
little about this ‘heart’, in which morality is presumably enfolded. Now, on whichever 
ontology we adopt, it seems persuasive to suggest that bodies (with its hearts, brains, 
and so on) contribute to morality, that they transports moral convictions from one place-
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time to another as a more-or-less (un-)conscious memory (see Watson 1998)6. Further, 
it seems reasonable to describe this human body-work as indeed a work of folding: our 
bodies fold moral ‘choices’ in the here-and-now, as up against childhood events, inter-
personal relations, yesterdays’ TV-shows, and so on – in quite the same way as do 
material objects. The implication of such an argument for sociological methodology, 
and particularly for the ability to fully describe such associations, is exactly what is at 
stake in our concept of the quasi-actant.  
To explore these methodological consequences, however, we need first to look 
more closely at Latour’s philosophy of science, in terms of how social science works in 
a performative sense. In his article on The Politics of Explanation (1988b), Latour 
distinguishes two fundamentally different ways of relating phenomena, A and B, in 
scientific practice. In the standard approach, A is used to correlate, predict, or comment 
on B; in the second approach, this very work of abolishing explanatory distance is itself 
taken as object, thus displaying the extended scientific work of making up explanations. 
To take an example, Latour’s interest in statistics would have more to do with how 
statisticians work to dissolve, say, the empirical distance between education and income 
– by using questionnaires, indexes, constructing variables, and so on – than with the 
statistical relation between the two phenomena as such. Empirically, education is not 
‘like’ income, but statistics works on both – e.g. by representing them in numbers – 
thereby making the latter predictable from the former. Statistics thus abolishes distance 
through a kind of interpretation, but by describing the work of the statisticians, the same 
distance can be fully displayed, unfolding the many translations. This is the sense in 
which Latour wants to move from explanation to description: from explanations of 
action-at-a-distance (e.g. how education influences income) to descriptions of work 
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through mediators (e.g. statistical representations and other ‘inscription devices’)7. 
Indeed, failing to pay attention to mediators and instead inventing ‘hidden’ hyper-
causes, modern-day sociologists, according to Latour, problematically create and 
maintain their ‘Great Divides’ between action and structure, micro and macro, cause 
and effect (Latour 2005; see van Krieken 2002; Schinkel 2007)8. 
To sum up, by exploring this notion of social science as performative work, 
we can now clarify Latour’s position on the issue of explanation versus description: in 
his new politics of sociological method, the former is simply to be dissolved into the 
latter. Work, in the Latourian methodological sense, is to create and display the folded 
(and often black-boxed) relations which make something ‘explainable’ by something 
else. The example of morality can now be resumed, because moral convictions too, just 
like statistics, on the one hand reduces, translates, and interprets situations. Robbery, for 
instance, is translated into an offence against justice, perhaps against the law of 
property, demanding imprisonment. In short, moral convictions work, in the Latourian 
sense. On the other hand, morality is itself a folded phenomenon: as argued, it is 
embedded in networks of bodies, institutions, and things9. Here, however, our 
methodological concern re-emerges. Whenever moral convictions, in analogy with the 
hammer, ‘does something’ in a given situation, it satisfies the Latourian definition of an 
actant. But: can the foldings and workings of moral convictions be pursued, traced, 
mapped, in just the same way as that of the hammer? We might assume that moral life 
is not only more difficult to describe, as Latour would have it, but that it is constitutively 
obscure in its workings. Morality, we want to argue, ‘erases its traces’; and, by analogy, 
so too does other intangible social phenomena like affects and beliefs.  
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In exploring how this claim forces us to rethink the Latourian position on 
description and explanation, let us first visit a related set of issues. Perhaps our reading 
of Latour so far has been too literal: perhaps Latour relies to a far greater extent than we 
have allowed for on ‘common sense’, and hence on the adequacy of common sense 
explanation? In the next section, we argue that indeed he does – only to continue by 
pointing to some of the unsafe footings of common sense. 
 
 
3. Common sense explanation: Latour’s unsafe ally 
 
The argument so far is that Latour attempts to abolish theoretical explanations into 
descriptions of folding work. This position, however, can be further elaborated, by 
noting that Latour does not quite seem ready to abandon theory altogether: with ANT, 
he notes (2005:220f), theory is ‘a negative, empty, relativistic grid that allows us not to 
synthesize the ingredients of the social in the actors place’. While minimalist, Latour’s 
‘relativistic grid’ of theory may here be taken as his attempt to confront the circularity 
of the description-explanation conundrum. More precisely, Latour seems to implicitly 
be struggling with the familiar claim that theoretical interpretation is, in principle, the 
fundamental condition for description, since social effects can never be perceived 
directly – only states of affairs can. For example, ‘I will not learn from a No Smoking 
sign why some people obey it while many others ignore it’ (Collins & Yearley 
1992:318)10. Observing that fewer people smoke in rooms with No-Smoking signs than 
in ones without would be a simple statement of facts; we never really see the chain of 
effective associations. The crucial point is that an effect, such as that of a No Smoking 
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sign, not only cannot be established from the actant alone (as Collins and Yearley note), 
but neither from the actant and its surroundings taken together! Ultimately, the 
unfolding of social effects – or, in Latourian parlance, of chains of eventful mediation – 
is a question of interpretive explanations that can only be rendered probable by 
description. In social science practice, there is neither pure explanation nor pure 
description, only various ‘hybrids’ in-between. 
This, however, is not how Latour positions his methodological attempt to 
dissolve the ‘modernist’ ontology of causes and effects into fully describable chains of 
mediation. Rather, in his own investigations, he manoeuvres by invoking a kind of 
(reconstructed) common sense thinking11. In most familiar, taken-for-granted contexts, 
descriptions can be made sufficiently detailed as to contain the necessary elements of 
explanation and interpretation within the limits of conventional reasonableness. Quite 
commonly, such description will take the shape of a ‘followable’ narrative, given that 
narration is the syntax of common sense explanation (Abbott 2004:33). Against this 
background, it comes as little surprise that Latour prefers a sociology of ‘small 
histories’ to one of grand abstractions (see Latour 1996a); nor that his work on the 
transportation system Aramis adopts the stylistic genre of a detective story (see Austrin 
& Farnsworth 2005). In various types of familiar settings – including familiar genres of 
narrative – further explicating the elements of ‘theoretical’ interpretation would quickly 
become banal. Here, it is worth noting that such everyday settings, filled with culturally 
coded and thus ‘unnoticeable’ interpretive procedures, was exactly what constituted the 
starting point of Garfinkel’s ethno-methodological programme (see Bertilsson 
2004:378); and that Latour is, in many ways, an explicit heir to Garfinkel’s study of the 
common-sensual practices of actors in a variety of taken-for-granted social contexts 
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(Garfinkel: the home; Latour: the laboratory). Where they differ, however, is on the 
question of method: Garfinkel thought that social codes could only be made visible (i.e. 
described) by deliberately breaching them; Latour, on the other hand, is content to 
simply ‘follow the actors’, seemingly believing that social codes are there on the 
surface, to be described directly. 
The problem of description-versus-explanation does not, however, disappear 
this easily; in fact, it routinely sneaks back into Latour’s own writings, albeit in ways 
unacknowledged by him. To make this point clearer, let us look briefly at another of 
Latour’s analytical examples, this time co-written with Michel Callon. In writing about 
the strategies and actions of the Renault enterprise in developing their electric car, the 
authors at one point state (quite matter-of-factly) that ‘Renault wants to remain 
autonomous and indivisible, itself deciding what will be the social and technical future 
of the industrial world’ (Callon & Latour 1981:290). Evidently, this quotation performs 
one of the oldest tricks of the sociology of the social: it connects (in a quite ‘jumpy’ 
way!) the economically constrained black-box of Renault with its response (action) to 
various outside pressures (commercial, political, technical, moral). This amounts to a 
common sense explanation, since an element of description is supplied with what 
appears to be ‘reasonable’ and ‘self-evident’ interpretation, this time relying on what we 
might call a ‘generalized Machiavellianism’ of power-maximizing and strategy-oriented 
action. However, again stating what is rather obvious: this interpretation is opposed by 
much available literature (theoretical and empirical) on the subject of why and how 
companies act the way they do12. An interpretative choice is being made, but it is not set 
out explicitly as a choice, only presented as something resembling fact.  
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Latour, we should stress, does occasionally acknowledge this point about the 
inevitability of theoretical interpretation, for instance when talking about the 
uncertainties and responsibilities of social scientific work (Latour 2005:127f). Still, he 
seems to consider it a banal point, not worthy of much attention (see Latour 1988b). As 
we have tried to show with this small example, however, problems might run deeper 
than Latour wants to acknowledge: at stake is the inability to methodologically stratify 
the treatment of different levels of uncertainty in dealing with empirical observations; 
and hence ultimately of specifying what makes for a good description (see Savage 
2009). These limitations in methodological self-reflection become crucial, we believe, 
in the context of Latour’s widened field of theoretical application of ANT into all of 
sociality, particular given his tendency to ‘heterogenize’ the folds of human actants. In 
the following section, we attempt to rectify the imbalance by way of the concept of 
quasi-actants. Put briefly, we want to argue that the social world cannot be completely 
reduced to its genealogy of concrete associations (at least not by the sociologist trying 
to reconstruct it), and that ‘responsible description’ thus requires a modified set of 
concepts from those of Latour’s vocabulary. Again, however, it is important to stress 
that ours is a reconstruction, not a deconstruction, of Latourian ANT. 
 
 
4. Quasi-actants: empirical difficulty versus obscurity 
 
When dealing with a complex social phenomenon such as moral convictions, one 
analytical option – which Latour draws attention to in Morality and Technology (2002) 
– will be to reduce the phenomenon in question to its specific genealogy of relations 
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(folds and work). This, however, seems only a theoretical option: in social practice, 
moral obligations amongst human actants are likely to foster a bewildering array of 
open-endedness, obscurity, and controversy. Further, reducing a phenomenon like 
morality to its specific genealogy would be to miss the crucial role that moral 
convictions come to play in social life, by becoming ‘self-referential’ in their 
performance and reproduction. As soon as moral convictions are constructed in the 
minds and languages of human actants (including all the material folds this implies), 
one way of ‘putting it to use’ is to simply refer to it, in social interaction, as something 
valid or even universal. The same is true for collective representations such as ‘British 
society’, ‘democracy’, ‘youth culture’, and so on – in short, a great deal of the 
vocabulary of the sociology of the social so vehemently denied by Latour. All of these 
complex symbolic compounds have the potential to become what we will refer to as 
quasi-actants. The following exposition is meant to elaborate this concept, drawing on 
various intellectual resources all in the vicinity of Latour’s own work – and hence to 
position the concept clearly in relation to his descriptivist methodology. 
At various points, Latour comes close to acknowledging the phenomenon of 
quasi-actants. For instance, in We Have Never Been Modern (1993:117), Latour refers 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (2004a) through the notion of ‘territories’, 
which he contrasts to that of his own ‘networks’ (1993:117). In Latour’s paraphrase, the 
term territoriality becomes an inclusive allegory for all the invisible ‘ethers’ of 
‘society’, all of the ‘hidden social structures’ that are to be conceptually dissolved into a 
network ontology. Deleuze and Guattari themselves, however, entertain a slightly 
different take on territoriality. A major point of their critical work is to show that, even 
though social territories (in the widest sense) may have no ‘essential’ or ‘transcendent’ 
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existence, they nevertheless exercise considerable social power, since we are liable to 
constantly employ them socially. This is what Anti-Oedipus suggests: even though the 
Oedipus complex may be a fallacy – a neurosis disciplining the ‘schizophrenic’ nature 
of humans – it has come to encrypt us in Freudian triangles of mother, father, and child. 
Since, as Deleuze and Guattari notes (2004a:76), ‘we are forcibly confronted with 
Oedipus and castration’, as analysts and social actors we need to confront this 
territorializing entity, living its own life in our heads, in psychology textbooks, and on 
the couches of psychoanalysts. In the language of A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & 
Guattari 2000b:11): movements of de- and re-territorialization are inextricably caught 
up in one another, and need to be analyzed as such.  
Latour, however, shows rather little regard for analyzing the re-territorializing 
performances of specific social events. While he is right in noting that the social is not 
organized in ‘societies’, if we nevertheless employ society’s various languages and 
‘enact’ it as such, it will come to play a quasi-independent role (Deleuze & Guattari 
2004a:101). Interestingly, what Deleuze and Guattari are pointing to here is close to the 
famous ‘Thomas theorem’ in classic symbolic interactionist sociology: ‘if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas & Thomas 1928:572). 
As a present-day heir to both Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology and American pragmatism 
(see Latour 2004b), Latour really should have no objections against this fundamentally 
‘performative’ dictum. Even so, he has characteristically little to say about the meaning 
and consequences of social-symbolic ‘territorial’ performances (like ‘society’ and 
‘moral convictions’) in networking human actants. This is exactly the asymmetry we are 
pointing to, and trying to correct, through the concept of quasi-actants. 
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If actors keep ‘defending’ the territories, the structures, the social, the cultural, 
and so on – of what significance is it, then, that they ‘are not there’, according to Latour, 
if we still employ them, manage them, and thereby turn them into quasi-actants? The 
situation is parallel to that of Nietzsche, who famously proclaimed that ‘God is dead’. 
Deleuze and Guattari reminds us that this point of Nietzsche does not entail that God 
will no longer play any role: ‘what takes so long in coming to consciousness is the news 
that the death of God makes no difference to the unconscious’ (2004a:117; italics in 
original) . To paraphrase on one of Latour’s better-known claims (1993), and contra his 
own interpretation: ‘that we realize that the world has never been modern may not make 
much difference to our modernity’. Latour’s argument for leaving ‘territoriality’ (in the 
broad sense) behind in sociology must therefore, somehow, rest on the assumption that 
these powerful symbolic effects not only ‘do not exist’ – but that they do not exist at all. 
In other words, that they are not (or, no longer) employed and performed, once we have 
unfolded their genealogy of associations, showing that God, the Moral Imperatives, 
Oedipus, and so on, where never really prime essences of the social.  
This, however, seems highly implausible. Arguably, it runs counter to the idea 
of genealogy as a question of power-inflicted historical constructions of subjectivities, 
rather than any search for ‘origins’ (see Foucault 1984). Closer still to the phenomenon 
of moral convictions, Nietzsche (1997:23) observed the following as to the socially 
‘hereditary’ properties of such entities: ‘when the habit of some [morally] distinguishing 
action is inherited, the thought that lies behind it is not inherited with it’ (1997:23). 
What is interesting to note is that, according to this line of reasoning, the work of 
producing moral distinctions is ‘lost’ or ‘forgotten’ in its transmissions (if it was ever 
perceived in the first place), but moral habits as such are not. We ourselves, as Deleuze 
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and Guattari suggest, ‘summon’ moral convictions, and with them other social 
‘territories’, but these constructions from then on come to play a performative and self-
referential role in social life. In other words, the fact that moral convictions are not 
‘transcendental’ does not imply that they do not exist at all – that bodies, symbolic 
language and so on, does not perceive and reproduce this obscure ‘social unconscious’. 
This is what we want to convey through the notion of the quasi-actant. 
Just like a premonition of Latour, Nietzsche (1999) proclaims that ‘morality is 
constructed’, fabricated in stinking workshops! But contrary to Latour, Nietzsche’s 
intervention is meant to highlight how, at the same time, moral codes are awarded 
genuineness by human actants – they neglect its genealogy, thus providing it with a life, 
a (quasi-)actant-ship, that lies beyond the material-semiotic construction of it13. It is 
important to realize why raising these Nietszchean-Deleuzian (and symbolic 
interactionist) points in connection with Latour does not lead back to Durkheimian 
sociology of the social, but on the contrary attempts to smooth out Latour’s own 
asymmetry: society, moral convictions, group identities are not simply ‘out there’ – they 
are ‘worked-out-there’ by subject-object hybrids. Thus, while we indeed aim to level 
out some of Latour’s inter-objectivist biases, we would still agree to his ontological 
point about the fundamental inseparability of minds, bodies, and symbols (and their 
quasi-subjects) from the material world (and its quasi-objects). However, it should also 
be clear why the work of quasi-actants is fundamentally distinct from the ‘materialist’ 
work on which Latour bases his second empiricism: the Latourian dictum to ‘just go on 
describing’ is in need of re-specification, because quasi-actants, such as moral folds, are 
fundamentally obscure – not just difficult to uncover. 
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Having stated this, it is symmetrically important to emphasize that the term 
quasi-actant is not just a metaphysical category, or for that matter a black-box for 
unexplainable empirical observations; on the contrary, the performative existence of 
quasi-actants can be demonstrated empirically without much trouble. Religious zeal, 
‘war on terror’, neo-liberal ideologies, ethnic identities, moral-legal commandments 
(such as ‘do not steal’), and so on, these are all partly quasi-actants – something that 
acts in social life with primary reference to itself. These quasi-actants obviously also 
form part of networks, just like a hammer. Quasi-actants such as moral-legal 
commandments, however, do not call attention to themselves simply as constructions – 
if that was the case, there would be no point in criticizing Latour – but rather as 
semiotic-material elements that, from here on, act as if they were ‘transcendental’, thus 
by reference to themselves in their performative impact on the social world (see 
Bertilsson 2008). Simply put, these are the bases on which we interpret situations and 
judge other people’s actions, enabling us to go on in social life. But these quasi-actants 
have no easily identifiable ‘social form’: unlike hammers or indeed human individuals, 
they exist only in and through continuous and collective employment.  
Although quasi-actants will often embed human-centric concerns, however, 
this in itself does not lead into any reintroduction of Great Divides between subjects and 
objects. Quasi-actants, we note, are folded into things – and not only guns, No-Smoking 
signs, and speed bumps, but also constitutions, police forces, economic markets, and so 
on. All of these symbolic-material relations are amenable to description, Latourian 
style; what cannot be fully described, however, are the exact interpretive steps by which 
quasi-actants come to do particular work in specific social situations.  
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4.1. Notes on black boxes versus quasi-actants 
 
As already noted, the concept of quasi-actant is meant as a supplement to Latour’s 
notion of a black-box. Hence, at this stage, it is fitting to compare the two concepts – 
which, superficially, might resemble each other – in a direct way. By black-boxes, 
Latour (and Callon) refers to a set of stabilized relations; more specifically, in ANT 
language, ‘an actor grows with the number of relations he or she can put into black 
boxes’ (Callon & Latour 1981:284f). Can ‘society’, we may ask, be said to be a ‘black 
box’ in this sense? Evidently, this would only be as an umbrella term covering a 
network of actants in concrete relations – hence the dictum that ‘society explains 
nothing but must itself be explained’. But to actants somehow enrolled, in a network 
sense, into ‘societies’ through beliefs, practices, and socio-material relations, society 
enjoys a form of ‘quasi-existence’ – society quasi-acts on them as something they relate 
to. Indeed, as shorthands for relatively stable bundles of associations, Latour 
acknowledges the social existence of collective representations such as ‘IBM’, ‘France’, 
and ‘lower-middle class’ (see Latour 2005:11). However, contrary to these Latourian 
black-box examples – large-scale corporations, nation-states, social classes – the 
concept of quasi-actant is meant, in a positive sense, to encompass those very entities of 
collective social ‘ether’ renounced by his sociology: societies, moralities, identities, 
subjectivities. Further, compared to the mechanistic metaphor of the black-box, 
employing the concept of quasi-actant is, we believe, more conceptually appropriate in 
most standard social science settings, including those of companies and nations, where 
the very actant-ship of these intangible entities is at stake.  
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In particular, the concept of quasi-actant allows us to escape the dichotomous 
‘swing’ between actants and black-boxes in Latour’s semiotics-inspired social ontology. 
To illustrate this point, let us take up again the example of Latour and Callon (1981): 
Renault, in their view, is fundamentally still just a comprehensive network of concrete 
relations – shorter or longer, more or less stabile, more or less extended. The entire 
impetus of ANT would be to ‘re-open’ this black-box and examine its constitutive 
relations. Against this backdrop of Latourian social ontology, while ‘Renault’ is 
certainly a black-box, deciding whether it is also and simultaneously an actant seems to 
be a somewhat arbitrary analytical procedure. On the one hand, as a black-boxed macro-
entity, ANT highlights how ‘Renault’ is fundamentally a conglomerate of factories, 
employees, contracts, company cars, and so on. Nevertheless, as already noted, Latour 
and Callon seem to have no problem imputing (rather common-sense-like) actant-ship 
on this hybrid conglomerate, endowing it with quasi-intentions. This seems to us an 
unsatisfactory solution to classic issues of ‘methodological individualism’, based on an 
unresolved tension between semiotics and theoretical nominalism in Latour’s writings. 
Fundamentally, it seems, at the level of social ontology, Latour-the-nominalist wants us 
to realize that ‘Renault’ is not a ‘real’ actant, but rather shorthand for an extensive 
black-boxed network. Actors may use ‘Renault’ as a semiotic actant in their speech-acts, 
but Latour-the-analyst must re-translate it into a black-box.  
Contra this procedure, we emphasize how the concept of quasi-actants allows 
us to immediately grasp the way in which symbolic-material entities like Renault are 
invoked and employed variably in social life, often with great consequences. To give a 
simple example: on the stock exchange, exactly what part(s) of ‘Renault’ will ‘make a 
difference’ in actor’s economic calculations is obscure in empirical terms, enfolded as it 
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is in an environment of rapid information turnover, rumours, and advanced 
mathematical modelling (see Knorr-Cetina & Brügger 2002)14. Here, talking about 
Renault as a quasi-actant seems much more adequate than the black-box metaphor. In 
other words, it is exactly Renault-as-symbolically-enacted – that is, as quasi-actant – 
which investors and financial speculators on the stock exchange refer to in their work 
and talk. So, indeed, Renault can be dissolved (by Latour) into contracts, employees 
etc., thus displaying its constitutive relations. But when someone, sometimes, to some 
extend, consciously or unconsciously, invokes Renault-as-one-actant, such a Latourian 
analysis would, by its nature, leave out important empirical realities. 
By way of summing up, the methodological problem with Latourian 
descriptivism can thus be put more pointedly: he has left out a certain category of folds 
– those supported by the symbolic and performative powers of human actants – which 
are distinct from purely ‘material’ folds in terms of their social effects. The difference 
between black-boxes and quasi-actants lies, first, in the constitutively obscure origins of 
the latter, and second, in the putting to use of imaginary-symbolic objects, such as the 
external ‘coming-into-being’ of moral convictions, group identities, and so on. In short, 
folded subjectivities produce quasi-actants, to which Latour pays little attention. If one 
accepts this argument, it then becomes much harder to defend a pure common sense 
descriptivist position, since the influence of our experiences, of other actants’ work on 
us, on later ‘choices’ (‘moral’ folds) constitute a different order of uncertainty and 
obscurity from that of things folding morality (‘material’ folds). Again, this argument 
does not entail any privileging of imaginary-symbolic actants in the explanatory efforts 
of social scientists – we are not regressing into some version of ‘social constructivism’. 
Rather, in parallel to what Latour has already done for non-humans, turning them from 
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matters-of-fact to matters-of-concern, our concept of quasi-actant simply performs a 
similar operation at the level of human actors. 
We are now also in a position to briefly revisit Latour’s before-mentioned 
attempts to ‘heterogenize’ humans into a circulation of subjectifiers (or ‘plug-ins’) 
(Latour 2005:207ff). True to his black-box line of reasoning, these concepts helpfully 
point to the concrete, material folds and work producing different kinds of ‘generic’ 
personalities, be it ‘homo economicus’ in economics textbooks, ‘users of dishwashers’ 
in technological guidelines, and so on. By using the language of subjectifiers, Latour is 
attempting to avoid another Great Divide, this time between psychology and sociology, 
the divide between intrinsic (person) and extrinsic (society). However, since – as we 
have argued – the empirical ‘gap’ of action execution is always constitutively obscure 
(rather than simply difficult to describe), too often Latour is forced to retreat into 
another one of his methodological dictums: ‘if it leaves no visible trace, leave it blank’. 
To counter the limitations of this empiricist agnosticism, our concept of quasi-actant is 
designed, instead, to allow certain obscure forms of social-symbolic ‘objectifiers’ – like 
moral concerns, identities, desires – to (re-)gain an explicit role in empirical inquiry, 
without fundamentally breaking with ANT social ontology.  
A similar kind of argument can be made in relation to Latour’s notion of 
‘panorama’, set forth in Reassembling the Social (2005:183ff) as a conceptual ANT 
innovation, denoting the way actors contextualize each other by symbolically invoking 
social wholes, such as ‘globalization’, in specific speech-acts. Like other aspects of the 
social territory, Latour stresses, panoramas should be documented in the specific: who 
is doing the projecting, by what media, towards which audience, and so on. This, we 
believe, is valuable and suggestive; however, it once again leaves unspecified just how 
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the social analyst is supposed to fully describe the process whereby, as Latour notes 
(2005:189), panoramas end up equipping actors with ‘a desire for wholeness and 
centrality’. The continuous and collective enactment of such ‘desires’ for social 
meaning-wholes – whether moral convictions, group identities, or grand narratives of 
modernity – is simply not fully describable, since their social effects extend beyond 
their visible presence. In short, if we want to know what panoramas do as quasi-actants 
in social life, some level of interpretation is called for15. 
The important point, in sum, is that whereas Latour’s use of common sense 
description might have been acceptable when confined to studies of techno-science, it 
emerges as insufficiently attentive to quasi-actants at the moment when ANT is 
extended into the entire field of sociology. This line of criticism, evidently, serves to re-
open questions of the proper use of theory in sociological inquiry, given that forms of 
interpretation (either common sense or theoretical) will inevitably influence the way 
social life is ‘unfolded’. Space prevents us from pursuing this question fully; however, 
by way of drawing this article to its conclusion, we want to suggest what seems to us a 
promising way of ‘hybridising’ Latourian empiricism with theoretical work, in what we 
call virtual theory. In taking up this discussion, we again aim to stay true to fundamental 
tenets of ANT, this time related to the advantages of common sense description: that it 
stays attentive to the multifaceted folding of situated social actants. The question, of 
course, is how such empiricist attentiveness can be combined with a view to the 
obscurity of quasi-actants – a question, which seems to us to point beyond Latourian 
empiricism and into wider issues of contemporary sociological method. 
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5. Concluding reflections: re-folding theory into ANT empiricism? 
 
In this article, we have explored ways in which Bruno Latour’s newly formulated and 
comprehensive sociological programme – dubbed ‘sociology of associations’ (2005) – 
poses serious challenges of a meta-theoretical and methodological character. Setting 
forth his ANT agenda of redistributing our notions of ‘objectivity’ primarily within 
studies of science and technology, Latour has shown comparatively little regard to the 
symmetrical processes through which ‘subjectivity’ works in ‘objectifying’ itself into 
various performances of socio-material reality. In short, while attempting to maintain a 
generalized symmetry between human and non-human actants, more often than not, 
Latour seems in practice to be ‘heterogenizing’ human subjectivities onto a background 
of materially stabilized, and technologically shaped, assemblages. This is nowhere more 
apparent than in Latour’s analyses of how moral convictions are folded into material 
things like hammers and guns; here, his analyses leaves us short of understanding, let 
alone describing, how bodies, symbols, and subjective desires simultaneously contribute 
to the process of forging socio-technical effects. 
While sympathetic to Latour’s overall call for a sociology of associations – 
arguably one of the most exciting attempts in recent years of renewing the sociological 
enterprise from scratch – we take issue with his problematic reliance on common sense 
interpretation, embedded in the dictum to ‘just go on describing’. Instead, we call 
attention to the irreplaceable role of empirical obscurity, encountered when describing 
ephemeral social phenomena such as moral codes, group identities, and desires that 
constitutively ‘erase their traces’ while acting on the social. We dub this phenomenon 
‘quasi-actants’, showing how Latour’s (second) empiricism fails to deal adequately 
 27 
with it, and how it might nonetheless be re-integrated into ANT. Here, the concept of 
quasi-actant works to supplement notions of black-boxes and panoramas. As pointed 
out, such a conceptual reconstruction of ANT symmetry simultaneously entails a 
rethinking of the description-explanation-interpretation conundrum, in particular 
creating space for more ‘positive’ contributions from particular forms of theory in the 
empiricist sociology envisaged by Latour. 
On this concluding note, we believe our argument on Latour, empiricism, and 
quasi-actants carry more general consequences for on-going methodological debates in 
sociology, particularly in terms of how his promising notion of ‘negative theory’ might 
be made productive for sociological inquiry. Here, we agree with Latour’s injunction 
that, if left unchecked, ‘positive’ social theory easily develops into a highly problematic 
way of silencing the voices of empirical actants (see Latour 2005:220ff). In an 
important analogy, Latour compares the discipline of sociology to that of topology, with 
the aim being to follow the actants through ‘hills and valleys’, instead of jumping 
between theoretical ‘levels’ such as those of actors (micro) and structures (macro), as 
portrayed in ‘standard’ social theory (Latour 1983:153ff). Taking this concern seriously, 
we nevertheless maintain that certain forms of theoretical interpretations are called for, 
when confronted with the empirical obscurities of quasi-actants. Hence, we want to 
suggest that one way of fruitfully re-folding sociological theory into ANT ontology is to 
think in terms of virtual theory. We end with some thoughts on this reconstructed ANT, 
and how it enables a more general recasting of core issues in sociological method. 
With virtual theory, we follow Fraser (2006; 2009) in her sociological 
appropriation of this Deleuzian term, understood broadly as that dimension of the actual 
which is not directly observable – and which hence requires some work of conceptual 
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abstraction16. The function of virtual theory would thus be to provide just enough 
conceptual mobility for the sociologist to ‘go on describing’, in the face of inerasable 
empirical obscurity in the social landscape. Rather than relying on common sense 
interpretation, and instead of the Latourian dictum to ‘leave it blank’ (that is, denying 
the problem), such a notion of theory implies an attempt to deal in explicit and reflected 
ways with the radical uncertainties implied by any description of social reality. By 
contrast to typological approaches to social theory – which seek to define general social 
essences and their causal connections – virtual theory entails an analytical commitment 
to remain sensitive to the dynamic, non-causal, and intensive patterns of relational 
social life (see DeLanda 2002). At the same time, however, it also entails a commitment 
to move ‘beyond’ actual-states-of-affairs, by attending to the creative work involved in 
making connections between different levels of abstraction (Fraser 2009). This ‘beyond’ 
is constituted by conceptual categories of what could be: both at ontological and 
immediate empirical levels, conceptual distinctions institute a crucial ‘counterfactual’ 
space for on-going work of re-interpretation in the social sciences.  
Common sense and theory, on this account, are two degrees of the same 
process of inquiry: theory is common sense with a higher degree of explication and 
reflexivity about counterfactuals (see Abbott 2004). Hence, virtual theory constitutes an 
opening for dealing with the difficulties accompanying obscure quasi-actants, such as 
those highlighted in this article: moral convictions, group identities, desires, and other 
imaginary-symbolic social performances. Taking the sophisticated analytical frame 
developed by Latour as conceptual baseline, the question for virtual theory in any piece 
of inquiry should thus be: what further conceptual work is required in order to make 
sense of this specific quasi-actant? (see Holbraad 2004). Theory, here, is explicitly co-
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developed with empirical descriptions. In this sense, we are simply adding a positive 
value to the negative theory posited by Latour: in virtual shape, theory is a reflected way 
of dealing with the necessary choices entailed in giving any ‘account’ of the social 
world – and thereby of ‘responsible’ accounting as such (Fraser 2006). In other words, 
when invoking theory, the ideal should be to explicate the grid of uncertain possibilities 
– not to act as a synthetic surrogate for silencing the multiplicity of empirical voices.  
In practice, Latour’s work acknowledges this point; at the level of meta-
theory, however, he is limited by a strict version of descriptivism. This seems all the 
more curious when considering the fact that, among the few sociologists referenced 
positively by Latour, French neo-pragmatists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot can 
be said to exemplify exactly the notion of virtual theory set out here. In their work on 
the sociology of moral life (1991), Boltanski & Thévenot incorporate explicit elements 
of theoretical interpretation, developed through a reading of classical philosophies of the 
common good, in combination with detailed inquiries into everyday instances of social 
conflict, justification and critique. In developing their ‘justificatory regimes’, Boltanski 
& Thévenot are not claiming these as latent ‘causal structures’, an underlying reality 
revealed by omnipotent sociologists. Indeed, their six regimes have no actual empirical 
existence, in the same sense that ‘society’ has no actual empirical existence. Instead, as 
analytical categories formatted by social scientists out of more-or-less coherent 
everyday grammars, what these ‘virtual’ regimes do is to artificially enhance empirical 
similarities and differences, reveal regularities across sites, explicate interpretations and 
possibilities, and assist in further social science reflection.  
In short, the conceptual work of Boltanski & Thévenot – like creative and 
empirically sensitive conceptual work before them in sociology – function much like 
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Latourian ‘inscription devices’ in furthering social science inquiry. Only they do so by 
encompassing high levels of conceptual abstraction, in making connections not only 
between formal political philosophy and everyday moral reasoning, but by explicating 
their own interpretive relation to those epistemic traditions that have shaped the moral 
objects under study (see Brown 2010). In general terms, when treated as contingent 
quasi-actants, theoretical concepts serve to protect us from unfortunate intellectual 
folding-habits: like models, virtual theory institutionalizes a space for reflection on the 
‘coding’ of empirical sense-data. Pure habit, after all, would rather work as a non-
substantiated maintenance of taken-for-granted categories. In the final analysis, our 
notion of virtual theory thus corresponds to the meta-methodological argument sketched 
out in the beginning of this article: Latour’s distinction between description and 
explanation is itself artificial, denying their necessary hybridisation. 
We hope now to have shown how a simultaneous introduction of quasi-actants 
and virtual theory into an ANT social ontology leads us away from Latour’s own 
empiricism, and towards something we might call a ‘new interpretive descriptivism’. 
Here, quasi-actants introduce a fundamental uncertainty in any sociological description: 
one now has to explicitly choose to interpret the work of actants as either an 
employment of quasi-actants or as ‘independent’ mediation. Since this is a choice of 
interpretation, it can always be questioned in subsequent rounds of enfolding – and, 
contrary to the employment of black-boxes and panoramas in standard ANT, this choice 
is now forced out into the open. Virtual theory cannot tell us ‘what we are looking for’, 
but it can structure the evaluation of possibilities and uncertainties: ‘what actually 
happened here?’ is the meta-question that renders our reconstructed sociology of 
associations accountable. With quasi-actants and virtual theory, in short, we are not 
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regressing into sociology of the social, but elaborating a more symmetrical symmetry 
than the one advocated by the sociological empiricism of Bruno Latour. This is why our 
criticism is strictly immanent: Latourian sociology of associations remains the most 
promising candidate in contemporary sociology for seriously addressing the core 
problem of empirical obscurity, once it comes to methodological terms with its own 
Nietzschean, Deleuzian, and symbolic-interactionist legacies.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 It is important to stress that ANT is a collective endeavour, encompassing – alongside 
Latour – the work of Michel Callon, John Law, and others. For the purpose of this 
article, we focus strictly on the version of ANT presented by Latour in Reassembling 
the Social (2005), as embodying his sociology of associations. Arguably, Latour’s take 
on sociological methodology is subtly distinct from that of ANT co-founder John Law 
(e.g. 2002); however, exploring these relations is beyond the scope of this article. 
2 The Leibnizian-Deleuzian lineage (or folding) of this term is not important here, since 
Latour develops the concept in his own idiosyncratic way. Latour refers to Deleuze’s 
book on Leibniz, simply called The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993), adding that 
his usage of the concept of fold is ‘less Leibnizian than Deleuze’s’ (Latour 2002:248). 
3 ‘Being’ and ‘becoming’ are heavily loaded philosophical terms, but here we simply 
employ them as illustrations of Latour’s way of dealing with subjects and objects. 
Latour’s own primary reference in this regards is Whitehead, and his processual 
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ontology of events. See, e.g., Latour 1999:152f. For a discussion of this philosophical 
lineage in Latour’s work, see Fraser 2006. 
4 Characteristically, in the one article where Latour does take up the question of human 
folds directly, in speaking about the body (2004a), what interest him are the 
technological devices through which bodies learn to be affected (by things like smells). 
We return to Latour’s concept of ‘circulation of subjectifiers’ in section 4.1. 
5 In the next section, we dig deeper into Latour’s problematic alliance with common 
sense explanations. 
6 By ‘hearts and brains’ we are simply alluding to the work of bodies in mediating 
moral convictions, along lines suggested casually by Latour himself. We do not want to 
suggest that such convictions are essentially in or of these body-organs; like other quasi-
actants, moral convictions are heterogeneous phenomena, constituted both bodily, 
symbolically, and materially. This will become clearer as the article proceeds. 
7 ‘Inscription device’ is one of the oldest terms of ANT, stemming from Latour’s 
anthropology of science (e.g. Latour & Woolgar 1979), and connoting the many (mostly 
technical) devices through which experimental matter (rats, chemical substances) are 
translated into notes, texts, or graphs. 
8 Latour’s (2005) criticism of existing sociological theory is all the more scathing, 
because it relates to his more general critiques of the ‘Modern Constitution’ and its 
Great Divides between Society and Nature (1993). Surprisingly, whereas his fellow 
ANT co-authors Michel Callon (economics) and John Law (sociology) have both taken 
up the topic of the performative impacts of social scientific work, Latour himself has 
written relatively little on this issue (but see Latour 2004). On our part, the example 
should not be perceived as an appeal for abandoning the use of statistics in sociology.  
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9 In the actor-network literature, a number of conceptual alternatives to networks have 
arisen over the years: Michel Callon (2005), for instance, now speaks of ‘agencements’ 
as collectives of human beings, institutions, technical devices, and so on, with specific 
heterogeneous actors taking their shape from such collective assemblages. Latour 
himself has suggested speaking of ‘work-nets’ rather than networks, to capture this 
sense of dynamic co-agencies. While important, however, these conceptual refinements 
are not crucial for us in establishing our point about quasi-actants.  
10 While we refer to Collins and Yearley on this specific point, our general questioning 
of Latour’s methodology bears only superficial resemblance to that expressed in the so-
called ‘epistemological chicken’ debate (see also Callon & Latour 1992). 
11 Indeed, in his work on the Politics of Nature (2004b:242), Latour is careful to restore 
the notion of common sense to epistemological glory: ‘whereas it may be permissible to 
force good sense somewhat with venturesome arguments, it is always necessary to 
verify that one is finally rejoining common sense’. 
12 So, depending on theoretical paradigm, other analysts might focus on how the 
employees of Renault identify socially with the company as a meaningful entity; how 
Renault as an organization is committed to values of techno-scientific progress and 
environmental protection; etc. etc.   
13 Throughout his work on moral convictions, Nietzsche of course talks mainly of 
Christianity, with its chaste nuns and church fathers depicted – we might say – as an 
extended network of psychological resentment (see Nietzsche 1997; 1999). Given that 
Latour has recently written extensively on Catholic faith, this provides an interesting 
area for exploring the limitations of his ‘anti-transcendental’ descriptivist approach (see 
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Holbraad 2004), clearly contrasting to that of Nietzsche. For a more systematic analysis 
of the Nietzschean legacy in Latour’s work, see Bruun Jensen & Selinger 2003. 
14 One only has to think of the ongoing financial crisis to grasp some of the ‘prodigious 
effects’ produced by the obscurity of quasi-actants – in this case, the circulation of 
expected, that is, virtual profit. 
15 Latour, on his part, primarily invests his panoramas with political effects: the task of 
gradually composing collective life. While space prevents us from pursuing this point, 
compared to our notion of quasi-actants, this seems to us a prematurely limited role. 
16 In Reassembling the Social (2005:59), Latour at one point (in a footnote) relate his 
own concept of mediators to this Deleuzian terminology: concatenations of mediators, 
he suggests, ‘actualize virtualities’. Tellingly, however, Latour at no point specifies 
what this notion of virtualities implies in terms of his own methodological vocabulary. 
For more on the relation between Latour, Deleuze and the virtual, see Fraser 2006.    
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